The increasing policy interests and the vivid academic debate on non-tariff measures (NTMs) has stimulated a growing literature on how NTMs affect agri-food trade. The empirical literature provides contrasting and heterogeneous evidence, with some studies supporting the 'standards as catalysts' view, and others favouring the 'standards as barriers' explanation. To the extent that NTMs can influence trade, understanding the prevailing effect, and the motivations behind one effect or the other, is a pressing issue.
Introduction
Since the negotiations of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which have substantially reduced tariffs and fostered global trade, the level of non-tariff measures (NTMs) has remained high and, indeed, has increased over time (Harvey, 1994) . The NTMs are policy measures, alternative to tariffs, capable of modifying trade flows (Arita et al., 2017) . The growing use of NTMs has led to a less transparent trade policy environment (Fernandes et al., 2017) , which calls for a deeper understanding on if and how NTMs influence trade.
The importance of understanding the trade effects of NTMs in agri-food sector is attested by the large and increasing number of papers hosted in top journals (e.g. Union. In addition, the existing reviews are qualitative analyses, exception made for who propose a meta-analysis to explain the causes of variation in estimated effects of technical measures on trade of agri-food and manufacturing industries. By analysing a set of 27 papers that are theoretically based on gravity model, show that some determinants (e.g. specific agri-food sectors, exclusion of multilateral resistance terms) are associated with trade-impeding effects of technical measures. Some issues, however, are still underinvestigated. For instance, do not deepen on the effects of the review process (a major driver in meta-analyses) and on the influence of types and proxy of NTMs, as well as on the aggregation level at which the study is conducted 1 .
We review empirical evidence on the effects of NTMs on global trade of agri-food products. We conduct a meta-analysis to conclude on potential determinants of heterogeneity in estimates. In order to complement previous studies, we analyse a larger, and more recent set of empirical researches on the trade effects of NTMs, by following methodological arguments of meta-analysis (Stanley and Jarrell, 1989 Stanley et al., 2013) . We explain how magnitude, direction, statistical significance, and accuracy of estimates depends on types of NTMs, proxies used for NTMs, level of detail at which the study is conducted, methodological issues, and publication process. Our analysis complements the existing debate on how, and in which direction, NTMs tend to influence trade.
The trade effect of non-tariff measures

A theoretical perspective
Tariffs are protectionist by definition: they undermine the social welfare by crowding out trade . Non-tariff instruments may be protectionist or competitive for trade: they imply welfare redistributions by addressing market imperfections such as asymmetric information and externalities (Xiong and Beghin, 2014) . From a social perspective, while the optimal level of tariffs is zero, determining the optimal level of non-tariff instruments is challenging (Swinnen and Vandemoortele, 2011; due to the complex relationship linking trade and social effects of non-tariff instruments (Sheldon 2012 ).
The understanding of non-tariff instruments has changed overtime: as the term 'non-tariff barriers'
(NTBs), which emphasises their protectionist scopes (e.g. quotas, export restraints), has been replaced by 'non-tariff measures' (NTMs), in order to emphasise their potential role of hampering or facilitating trade (Grant and Arita, 2017) . In a small open economy the policymaker sets NTMs on a product category, produced in domestic market and imported from country's trading partners, in order to maximise the domestic welfare: in domestic market, the optimal level of NTMs depends on the trade-off between the marginal utility gain for consumers and the marginal cost for producers. The effects on domestic welfare are influenced by trade strategies of trading partners. Exception made for the case in which the effects on domestic production exactly offset the effects on domestic consumption , NTMs are capable of influencing trade.
From consumers' perspective, NTMs are socially desirable and provide higher social well-being: by reducing asymmetric information and/or externalities, NTMs enhance consumers' trust, reduce transaction costs and increase consumers' demand (Xiong and Beghin, 2014) . The growing demand and the higher costs of implementing NTMs increase the equilibrium price and, as a consequence, the consumption expenditures. The net effect of NTMs on consumers' surplus depends on the magnitude of (positive) utility gain compared to the size of (negative) effect on consumption expenditures: the higher the consumers' utility, the higher the willingness to pay a higher price for products under regulation (Crivelli and Gröschl, 2016; .
From producers' perspective, NTMs imply higher costs of compliance, both fixed costs (e.g.
upgrade of practice codes and facilities, acquisition of certificates, conformity in marketing requirements) and variable costs (e.g. prolonged delivery time due to inspection and testing procedures at custom points, rejection of certain shipments, denial of entry of certain shipments) (Xiong and Beghin, 2014; Crivelli and Gröschl, 2016) , determining a reduction in profits and supply. The reduced supply increases the equilibrium price and producers' revenue. The net effect on producers' profits depends on the magnitude of (positive) gain in revenue, compared to the size of (negative) implementation costs: the lower the implementation costs, the higher the gain in revenue for products under regulation .
For exporters, a NTM implemented in the destination country implies higher costs of compliance and a higher import price. If the difference between import price pre-and post-NTM is greater (smaller) than the difference between domestic price pre-and post-NTM, domestic producers face smaller (greater) implementation costs and obtain greater (lower) profits than foreign producers.
The NTM acts as barrier (catalyst) for trade if it reduces (increases) domestic imports ). Due to the large heterogeneity in trade effects of NTMs, a systematic assessment of potential determinants of these effects is worth.
An empirical perspective
The meta-analytical approach
The heterogeneity characterises all economic researches (Havránek, 2010) The MA is becoming more and more popular in economics: for instance, it has been applied to the price elasticity of demand (Böcker and Finger, 2017) , the calorie-income elasticity (Santeramo and Shabnam, 2015) , and to food safety (Xavier et al., 2014 
Literature searching criteria and selection process
During the last twenty-five years the trend of (theoretical, 32%, and empirical, 68%) papers on nontariff measures (NTMs) has been exponential ( figure 1 ). 
Empirical model
The heterogeneity in the estimated trade effects of measures (ETEMs) is likely to depend on publication selection and characteristics of empirical studies. The t-statistics of ETEMs 7 () are regressed on the precision of the estimates (i.e. the inverse of the estimated standard error, ), on J regressors related to the characteristics of the study (χ ), and on K regressors related to potential publication selection (Ζ ): We estimate model in equation (1) through a robust regression technique to mitigate potential problems related to outliers and influential data points (Belsley et al., 1980) . Influential data points are likely to exist in our sample because we use multiple estimates from the same study (that are likely to be correlated). Coefficients of the robust regression allow us to infer on the magnitude of ETEMs.
In order to determine which drivers may explain the direction (positive or negative) of statistically significant ETEMs, we use a Multinomial Logit (MNL) model: the dependent variable is categorical ( ) 8 and it allows us to classify the ETEMs as negative (t-statistic lower than −1.96), not significant (t-statistic between −1.96 and 1.96), or positive (t-statistic higher than 1.96):
By substituting the equation (2) in (1), we derive a system of two equations:
where ln are the logarithms of the probability of having, respectively, negative and significant (rather than not significant) or positive and significant (rather than not significant) ETEMs.
A Probit model is adopted to explain the drivers for statistical significance, and a Tobit model is used to deepen on the magnitude of the estimated t-statistics (accuracy of ETEMs). The dependent variable of the Probit model is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the i-th ETEMs is statistically significant (t-statistics lower than −1.96, or higher than 1.96), and 0 otherwise:
The dependent variable of the Tobit model is a continuous variable equal to the t-statistics of ETEMs (), if it is larger than the threshold value (1.96 in absolute value), and 0 otherwise:
In the Tobit model, both right-and left-censored, positive coefficients imply greater t-statistics and, thus, less accurate ETEMs; vice-versa for negative coefficients.
In line with Li and Beghin (2012), we use a robust estimator of the clustered error structure to estimate MNL, Probit, and Tobit models. We assume independence among clusters (i.e. papers), and dependence among observations within each cluster (i.e. ETEMs of the same paper).
Description of covariates
Our model includes covariates related to the characteristics of the study (χ ) and to the publication selection (Ζ ), to explain heterogeneity in estimated effects of non-tariff measures (NTMs).The set of covariates related to the characteristics of the study allows us to control for types of NTMs, proxies for NTMs, and the level of detail of the study. We control for potential publication selection: some covariates are related to methodological issues, others to the publication process. In particular, we control for the adoption of fixed effects to account for multilateral trade resistance terms in gravity models, and for the treatment of zero trade flows. The zero trade flows problem is a common issue in studies based on the gravity equation; our sample includes several papers (87%) based on the gravity model.
As for the publication process, we account for the prestige of the publication outlet, and for grey literature with specific dummies: one dummy controls for papers published in Q1 journals (according to the rank provided by Scimago Journal & Country Rank at the date of publication for the subject area 'Economics and Econometrics') and one dummy accounts for working papers.
Furthermore, we use a dummy variable to control for the presence of more than one article published by the same author. Table 2 lists the covariates. 9 Countries frequently fix MRLs, as an alternative to SPSs, in order to ensure safe imports. The requirements on MRLs are not set in the WTO consultations, but they may be assimilated to the SPS A200 that sets the tolerance limits for residues and imposes a restricted use of certain substances in food and feed (UNCTAD, 2012). Due to these considerations, we distinguish SPSs and MRLs in separate categories. 11 The distribution and kernel density estimated in figure 2 refer to a subsample which ranges between the 10 th and the 95 th percentiles. Tot. Pos.
(ii) Kernel density estimate 
Regression results
We compare the results of robust regression, Multinomial Logit (MNL), Probit, and Tobit models As for the proxies used for NTMs, ETEMs tend to be lower and significant, regardless of the proxy (table 4, 507), who observe that "when the NTM is a SPS policy regulating agri-food exports from a developing exporter to a developed importer, the probability to observe a trade impeding effect increases substantially".
If data are aggregated at HS-2 digit or HS-4 digit, ETEMs are greater (table 4, column A): in particular, the higher the disaggregation, the higher the probability of significant ETEMs, that tend to be less accurate if significant negative (table 4, columns D and E).
As for specific product categories, ETEMs tend to be greater for cereal (table 4, column A), significant (either negative or positive) with higher probability for meat, but not for dairy (table 4, columns B, C, and D), more accurate if significant positive for fats and oils (table 4, columns F). In line with Li and Beghin (2012) we show that technical measures are not likely to be tradeenhancing for processed food products (e.g. dairy produce, fats and oils), while we also found that this is not always true (e.g. meat). Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
22
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
The coefficient has been omitted because of collinearity. Studies that include country-pair fixed effects provide lower and significant ETEMs (either negative or positive) with a higher probability (table 4, Our analysis deepens on several issues: a number of variables contribute to explain the heterogeneity in ETEMs. The magnitude of estimates is favoured by certain factors (type of NTMs, product aggregation), but limited by other determinants (proxy for NTMs, 'cereal', 'country-pair f.e.', 'time f.e.', 'zero trade', publication process). Some factors reduce the likelihood of having significant estimates ('dairy'), others intensify this likelihood (proxy for NTMs, 'authors', 'countrypair f.e.', 'N-N', 'HS-4 digit', 'meat'). Moreover, some variables boost (proxy for NTMs, 'authors', 'country-pair f.e.', 'zero trade', 'meat') and others hamper ('SPS', 'TBT') the probability of estimating trade-impeding effects. Similarly, the likelihood of estimating trade-enhancing effects may be either intensified ('authors', 'country-pair f.e.', 'MRL', 'AVE', 'meat') or limited ('Q1', 'WP', 'product f.e.') by specific variables. In addition, the accuracy of significant negative estimates increase with type of NTMs and decrease with 'HS-4 digit'; vice-versa, the accuracy of significant positive estimates is favoured by certain variables ('SPS', 'MRL', 'N-N', 'F&O'), but not by others ('product f.e.', 'Q1'). Table 5 synthesises the evidence of our empirical models. 
Conclusions and policy implications
The rapid growth of non-tariff measures (NTMs) has stimulated an interesting academic debate.
Discriminating between the economics and the politics of NTMs is a challenge for academics and policymakers: theory suggests that NTMs may both stimulate and hinder trade .
Accordingly, in literature, two opposite views prevail: 'standards as barrier' versus 'standards as catalyst', with the empirical evidence being quite heterogeneous.
In order to characterise the heterogeneity in estimates, we qualitatively and quantitatively reviewed the empirical literature on the effects of NTMs on global agri-food trade. We explain the differences in findings, in terms of magnitude, direction, statistical significance, and accuracy of estimates, with several control factors: types of NTMs, proxies used for NTMs, level of details of studies, methodological issues, and publication process. We build on the existing evidence provided in Li and Beghin (2012) with further details and focusing on the agri-food sector.
We found that the estimated trade effects of measures (ETEMs) are overestimated by types of We analyse a wider sample in terms of number of papers considered (62 papers), type of measures investigated, and theoretical framework (not only gravity-based papers). As for the type of measures under investigation, in addition to SPSs, TBTs, MRLs, we include studies on standards that pursue similar scopes (e.g. protect consumers' health and safety, reducing asymmetric information): some examples are quality and quantity control measures, private standards, voluntary standards, requirements on Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs).
We use a twice as large set of explanatory variables. We expand the number of variables able to influence the likelihood of acceptance of the study (7 vs. 2) , and find that they matter. We also expand the number of variables that may affect magnitude and direction of the estimates (13 vs. 9).
In particular, we use dummy variables to explain the influence of type of NTMs, proxy used for NTMs, and level of details of the study. 
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A.3 Description of the sample 
